COP17 takeaways: Nature as infrastructure

Introduction

The Group BPCE and Natixis CIB Green & Sustainable Hub sent four delegates to the COP17 on biodiversity, who participated in side-events, roundtables (with EIB and EBRD for instance[1]. One of them is sharing his insights and takeaways on the political event itself, as well as on the side-dynamics around nature finance, including in capital markets.

At COP17 in Yerevan, the first global review of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) set out a difficult starting point: the world is not on track to meet the framework’s 2030 targets. The state-level negotiations therefore focused not only on what countries have promised, but on how those commitments can be translated into policies, finance and measurable outcomes.

Alongside this official agenda, a broader discussion within civil society and the private sector is gathering momentum: nature is not simply an environmental concern, but infrastructure that supports economies, protects communities and reduces risk. Forests, wetlands, mangroves and watersheds are vital natural infrastructure, providing essential services that businesses and societies depend on. The challenge is to account for those contributions in investment and policy decisions—without losing sight of the local ecosystems and communities involved.

Progress varies across the framework’s 23 targets[2]. Restoration measures are being reported, and some indicators for climate action, sustainable use and biodiversity knowledge are improving. But these signals do not establish that the targets will be achieved. In many areas—including pollution, sustainable production, consumption and urban nature—countries report implementation gaps or insufficient evidence of progress.

Target 3, the “30 by 30” commitment, illustrates the difference between expanding coverage of protected areas and delivering effective conservation. The target calls for at least 30% of land and inland waters, and 30% of marine and coastal areas, to be effectively conserved by 2030. Figures in the review revealed that, among the reporting Parties (100 countries over 196), protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures cover 16.7% of terrestrial and inland-water areas and 19.5% of marine and coastal areas. A separate global dataset[3] gives different estimates: 18.4% for land and inland waters, 23.2% of marine areas within national jurisdiction, and 10% of the global ocean, including areas beyond national jurisdiction. These measures were established on a larger number of countries, so they should not be compared as if they were equivalent.

Nor does area coverage alone show whether conservation is effective or equitable. Management, connectivity, ecological representation and fair governance remain concerns, as do the recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ rights and the identification of OECMs[4]. A separate analysis[5] suggests that land coverage could reach about 27.5% by 2030 if existing quantified national commitments are fulfilled. This is a scenario based on commitments, not a guaranteed outcome.

Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs) secured a concrete institutional outcome at COP17. Parties agreed the operating arrangements established at COP16. The agreement gives IPLCs a standing forum within the Convention to contribute their knowledge and perspectives to biodiversity discussions, rather than relying solely on ad hoc participation. The negotiations over how IPLCs would be represented in the body were contested, and the final arrangements reflect compromise. The outcome is therefore a significant step towards more structured participation, but it does not by itself guarantee equal decision-making authority or ensure that IPLC input will shape outcomes in practice.

Finance remains a central point of debate. The KMGBF calls for at least $200 billion a year in biodiversity finance from all sources by 2030, including $30 billion annually in international public finance. It also calls for eliminating, phasing out or reforming at least $500 billion a year in harmful incentives[6].

The OECD[7] estimates that global biodiversity finance reached USD 74.9–92.4 billion per year in 2023–2025. Separately, international public biodiversity finance increased by 94% between 2018–2020 and 2023–2024[8]. The overall estimate remains below the KMGBF’s goal of mobilising at least USD 200 billion annually by 2030.

Countries remain divided over who should contribute to international public finance and how funding should be delivered, including the roles of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) Fund. Announcements included a reported $4.4 billion for the GEF’s ninth replenishment and $60 million in contributions to the GBF Fund, taking its total to around $400 million.

Reforming harmful subsidies is politically sensitive because it involves agricultural support, fossil fuels and land-use decisions. France announced a commitment to reduce identified harmful subsidies from €11.2 billion to €9.5 billion. But the global review indicates that reform remains limited, while the 2025 milestone for identifying harmful incentives was likely missed, pending complete reporting.missed, only 19% of reporting parties valued harmful incentives and subsidies.

 

The negotiations also include benefit-sharing from digital sequence information on genetic resources. The Cali Fund is intended to channel benefits from the use of such information in sectors including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and biotechnology. Making the mechanism work in practice has proved complex; the fund was reported to hold $10,000. Under the Cali Fund contribution modalities adopted at COP16, large companies in sectors that directly or indirectly benefit from the use of digital sequence information (pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture) are called on to contribute 1% of profits or 0.1% of revenue.

 

For companies, nature is both an operational dependency and a source of risk: water constraints can affect data centres and power generation, while raw-material scarcity can disrupt supply chains. A methodology presented by the Landbanking Group and the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity[9] (IAPB) aims to translate nature-related risks and investments into financial measures such as EBITDA and enterprise value.

A range of standards and metrics is emerging. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) [10], engaged with 48 countries, is consulting on a practice statement related to nature risks. The Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) has announced version 2.0 of its framework, and more than 1,000 companies have published TNFD reports[11]. The Nature Positive Initiative is developing “state of nature” metrics, while the Science Based Targets Network (SBTN) has announced SBTN 2.0. Together with GRI and European reporting requirements (CSRD), these initiatives can help structure company assessments. But disclosure alone does not demonstrate reduced impacts or redirected investment: information must be comparable and inform business, lending and investment decisions.

At COP17’s Finance and Biodiversity Day in Yerevan on 26 October 2026, Frank Elderson, a member of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Executive Board, described natural capital as “another kind of infrastructure that we often take for granted.” Nature provides water for industry and agriculture, healthy soils for food systems, and forests, wetlands and oceans that help regulate climate-related risks. Assessing natural capital in the future remain a challenge as Nature scenarios in financial modelling may still be three to four years away according to the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), leaving a data and modelling gap.

Nonetheless, framing nature as an infrastructure supports its financing at the scale of ecosystems as a risk mitigation measure. Because watersheds, forests and habitats cross administrative borders, landscape financing should bring together companies, investors, public authorities, land managers, Indigenous Peoples and local communities around shared priorities defined by ecosystems’ biophysical boundaries. Its success depends on clear governance, respect for rights, and agreement on costs, benefits and outcomes.

Scaling projects is challenging: land-rights and regulatory uncertainty, limited public-sector capacity to compare nature-based and conventional infrastructure, and questions about sharing costs between public budgets and private capital can all slow investment.

Conclusion

The direction of travel is encouraging, even if progress remains gradual. Central banks’ growing focus on environmental risks could influence banks’ practices over the next two to three years and, in turn, shape expectations for their corporate clients. 

Work on nature-related risk, returns and stress-testing scenarios is also advancing. Emerging sectoral nature-positive pathways, developed with input from organisations such as WWF and the UK’s environment ministry, could help translate broad ambitions into targets that companies and capital markets can use. ISSB initiatives and the development of future NGFS scenarios will be important areas to watch.

Nature finance is not yet driving substantial capital expenditure, but companies and financial institutions are increasingly incorporating nature into their thinking. The next challenge is to turn that growing awareness into investment and coordinated action—particularly at landscape scale—capable of reducing risks and delivering measurable benefits for ecosystems and the communities that depend on them.

[1] ADB (October 2026), “From Restoration to Investment: Who Pays for Nature at Scale?”, available here.

[2] Global report on collective progress in the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, available here

[3]  World Database on Protected and Conserved Areas (WDPCA), available here

[4] An Other Effective Area-Based Conservation Measure (OECM) is a geographically defined area located outside of a traditional Protected Area that is governed and managed in ways that achieve positive, sustained, long-term in-situ biodiversity conservation, along with associated ecosystem functions and cultural, spiritual, or socio-economic values.

[5] Immerzeel, R., M. Kok, S. Troost and C. Krüger (2026), From global ambition to national commitments: National target setting under the Global Biodiversity Framework.  Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), 2026, available here

[6] The CBD describes harmful (or “perverse”) incentives as economic, legal or institutional incentives arising from policies or practices that encourage unsustainable behaviour that damages biodiversity. The harm can be an unintended side effect of a measure designed for another purpose. A harmful incentive is therefore not necessarily a subsidy in the narrow sense; it can also arise from laws, rules or other practices.

[7] An overview of global biodiversity finance (2026), OECD, available here

[8] OECD, Global biodiversity finance available here

[9] IAPB & Landbanking Group Nature Credit ROI, available here

[10] IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Practice Statement 1 Nature-related Disclosures, available here

[11] TNFD  2026 Status Report, available here